Abstract: In this proposal we examine the make/buy dichotomy for asset acquisition in the context of IT outsourcing transactions. Recent strategic management research extended transaction cost economics and incentive systems to theorize transaction arrangements and categorize them by three independent dimensions of control. Using a sample of transactions from an IT consulting firm, we offer the first empirical tests of the relationship between use of these arrangements in transactions and the value created and captured through the transaction. Our research contributes to strategic management literature by empirically confirming new theory and to outsourcing literature by validating the theory’s more nuanced ability to better analyze outsourcing transactions. This research contributes to scholars’ understanding of how transaction properties and their governance arrangements influence value creation and capture.

Abstract: Speed of action is an important dynamic of firm strategy in competitive interactions. However, the existing research related to organizational speed in a competitive context is devoid of a unified theoretical perspective. In this review, we evaluate the research that examines the role of speed in rivalrous settings and the implications of organizational speed for firm performance. We propose that organizational speed is a multidimensional capability and sequence its dimensions to show their interrelatedness within the focal firm and the dynamics between rival firms. We show how our model sheds new insights into the competitive dynamics and first mover advantage literatures. Our work not only highlights current research findings and deficiencies, but also directs future research to a broader perspective about speed in competitive interactions.

Abstract: Jonathan Jones, a credit cardholder, purchases a 70’’ TV from a specialized electronic retailer using his American Express credit card: you just witnessed a transaction in a so-called “two sided-market” where the value for a player (the cardholder) on one side of the market depends on the number of players on the other side (merchants), and reversely. This two-sided market is organized and intermediated by the “platform leader”, in that case American Express. The paper explores the nature of this market structure as part of a larger category of market structure called the “multi-sided market”, and sets up the foundation for a larger study to understand the strategic implications of the multi-sided market structure and the associated Intermediation phenomenon.

Abstract: This study proposes that, in order to gain a sustained competitive advantage, a firm must become a part of diverse external networks that bridge across the boundaries separating different elements of a social structure. More diverse external networks should expose a firm to a broader spectrum of new paradigms emerging in the disjointed parts of the environment. Nevertheless, the paper suggests that to optimize performance gains, a firm must be able to identify and capitalize on the most critical emerging contingencies. Consequently, the paper links organizational performance to the interactive effect of diverse external networks and the internal ability to identify and address critical environmental changes. The paper suggests that the stronger interactive effect can represent a better alignment between evolving market expectations and a firm’s internal operations.