Abstract: We explore competition between for–profit and non-profit or cooperative organizational forms. Cooperatives are able to gain market share from for-profit organizations when the latter experience legitimacy crises. However, we argue that cooperatives’ ability to gain market share rests not just on the declining popularity of the latter during disruptive events, but also the competitive strategies that cooperatives take to maintain market positions during times of normalcy. We investigate these issues by studying how the recent US financial crisis affected market share for banks and credit unions from 2004-2012.

Abstract: Many 21st Century challenges affect public, private and non-profit actors alike, and solving them requires cross-sector collaboration. The ability to select partners that are very different and design effective partnerships with them is therefore critical. While the alliance and networks literatures explain how organizations within the same field or industry develop ties with one another, we still don’t know how organizations that are very different from each other can jump-start their networks. This is an inductive study of the United Nations World Food Program's partnerships with the corporate sector over 12 years. It contributes to the alliance networks literature by shedding light on alliance formation as a distinct capability and showing how node characteristics alter the dynamics of network evolution.

Abstract: This paper makes an economic case for corporate social responsibility. We develop a formal model of CSR, comparing the provision of a social good by for-profit and non-profit organizations, and derive conditions under which a for-profit is better able to serve stakeholder interests than a non-profit, even as it maximizes shareholder returns. We show that this is the case when a firm can use its business resources and capabilities to serve stakeholder needs more efficiently in-house, or when it can leverage its market advantage to raise additional resources and thus serve as an intermediary for a non-profit. We also derive conditions in which CSR raises shareholder profit at the cost of stakeholder interests, and examine the nature of causes in which CSR is most advantageous.