Abstract: This study explores how investors in foreign markets perceive state ownership and executives’ political connections of cross-listed firms. Investors perceive these firm attributes through the lens of their own institutional context and their perceptions of the Chinese government. Investors in the United States perceive the strong intervention of the Chinese government in the economy as illegitimate whereas investors in Hong Kong have a much more pragmatic view of the role of the Chinese government. We propose that for Chinese firms cross-listed in US, state ownership and executives’ political connections are perceived negatively, whereas for Chinese firms cross-listed in Hong Kong, state ownership and executives’ political connections are perceived positively.

Abstract: A certification initiated by a recognized source is a third-party quality signal or cognitive shortcut which may impact the perception of organizations and individuals, which can also impact outcomes for them. While evidence indicates that positive certifications predict outcomes such as firm performance and CEO pay, we know little about the role of negative certifications and their impact on individuals, such as board directors. In this study, we examine how negative board certifications influence the directors’ number of future directorships, as well as the quality of these future directorships.

Abstract: Theory and research on understanding activists targeting corporations have developed on two paths. On one path, scholars have applied agency theory to explain the involvement of shareholders in firm decision-making with a clear emphasis on financial issues. On the other path, scholars have taken a social movement perspective and highlight non-shareholder activists’ primary emphasis on non-financial, or social, issues. As a result of this distinction in the literature, extant theory and research offer no clear explanation for shareholder activism advocating for a stronger organizational focus on social issues. We examine the contrasting logics of the two theoretical lenses in a model predicting firm-level socially oriented shareholder activism as a consequence of change in corporate social performance. Our findings broadly support the social movement perspective.

Abstract: Monitoring capital market returns represents a primary concern for both managers and academics. Although stock market returns to organizational activities are thought to represent the perceived value of those activities, it is unclear whether or not this is actually the case. Building on a line of recent work in financial economics and accounting, we demonstrate that investors rely on information cues to help cope with limited attention. We find that investors respond negatively to activities when managers could engage in opportunistic behavior, but that these negative responses are significantly hampered by the presence of information to help investors rationalize why the activity is occurring. We couple principles from information economics and agency theory to contribute research in corporate governance.

Abstract: Strategy research has found that debt tends to have a detrimental effect on firm innovation. In this paper, we employ a stakeholder bargaining perspective to argue that this effect will be most pronounced when the firm’s bonds are concentrated in the hands of ‘bond blockholders’. Furthermore, we contend that the temporal orientation of bondholders will influence this relationship because it impacts the degree to which bondholders are motivated to encourage and support long-term value creation for the firm as opposed to just focusing on short-term value appropriation. Moreover, while agency theory has long suggested that there is an inherent conflict of interest between shareholders and bondholders, our results suggest that the temporal orientation of investors matters much more than the type of security they hold.

Abstract: While agency theory suggests that concentrated ownership influences a variety of strategic outcomes, research has yet to examine the potential for strategic change to emerge directly from actions taken by concentrated owners to influence the organization. In this study, we focus shareholder activism in the form of 13D filings and examine its influence on strategic change. We also explore whether such shareholder activism actions attract other investors who may benefit from the 13D investor’s influence on a firm’s strategy. Finally, we examine board independence and CEO leadership structure as potentially important factors for the 13D investor influence through shareholder activism. Our research offers several contributions to the literature on corporate governance and suggests a number of important questions for future research.