Session 144
Board Structure: What Works Best?
Track O |
Date: Tuesday, October 6, 2015 |
Track X |
Time: 17:30 – 18:45 |
Common Ground |
Room: Plaza Court 3 |
Facilitator:
- Ryan Krause, Texas Christian University
Abstract: We use upper echelons theory to derive hypotheses about the individual and joint effects of the board’s human capital, social capital, and demographic diversity on firm reputation. Our results show that the board’s social connections enhance the benefits on the firm’s reputation of having strong board human capital. We also detected a tradeoff in the case of diversity, with board social connections augmenting the impact of board gender diversity but weakening that of board age diversity on organizational reputation. Our results provide a more nuanced picture of how boards of directors serve firms and have important implications for director selection.
Abstract: It has been noted that the number of public officials serving on boards of directors have increased dramatically, and that when these individuals join a board, the company has an intended purpose of using their background to minimize hazards and gain benefits from government interaction and assist in a firm’s corporate political activities. However, it has also been shown that organizational elites tend to demonstrate a homogeneous set of political beliefs. Therefore, we investigate 1) the influence of the similarity of the political beliefs of the other board members (in aggregate) and the selected former government official and 2) the influence of the board appointment of a former government official on a strategic outcome, specifically corporate political activity.
Abstract: Lead directors preside over independent directors, occupying an influential position in organizations. This phenomenon has diffused rapidly among publicly-traded firms over the past fifteen years. Academics, however, have yet to weigh in on the consequences. In this study, we suggest that outcomes may be vastly different depending on why the firm adopted the position. We take advantage of a natural experiment wherein NYSE firms were mandated in 2003 to take a lead director whereas NASDAQ firms received no mandate. We find that NYSE adopters, who are complying with an institutional mandate, are less likely than NASDAQ adopters, who volitionally take on lead directors, to introduce good governance and, consequently, NYSE adopters have lower firm performance than NASDAQ adopters in the post-adoption period.
Abstract: Building on resource dependence and social network theory, we outline the antecedents and consequences of centralization and density in the social networks of boards of directors. We use directors' joint committee membership and demographics to infer social relationships embedded in intra-board networks. We contribute to the corporate governance literature by empirically testing the following research questions: a) How do external environmental and internal organizational demands influence board network structures?, and b) Are some structures more conducive to generating greater organizational returns than others?
Abstract: For several decades, previous studies have reported inconsistent findings regarding the association between board leadership structure and firm performance. Furthermore, previous research has ignored the relatively new development of having an independent lead director appointed within the board. In this study, we conduct a fuzzy set analysis of six causal conditions prevalent in the literature to determine whether there are one or several optimal board leadership structures. Our empirical results reveal that there are five different high-performing board leadership configurations, and four different low-performing configurations. These results suggest that future research needs to consider the nonlinear configurational context in order to best determine how board leadership influences firm performance, and that there are multiple ways to achieve high levels of firm performance.
Abstract: This proposal addresses the distinction between symbolic or substantial roles of board committees as well as possible outcomes of tendencies towards such substance and symbolism. Drawing on institutions theory, we assume that committees can be considered as firm-level institutions which can established and maintained isomorphically, the consequence being that the rules and routines formally tied to committees are not substantially applied, but only ceremonially imitated in order to gain legitimacy. In this context, using the example of audit committees, we contend that companies with a ceremonial audit committee do not take their purpose of seriously, which we expect to become visible in a lower decision making quality. Furthermore, we address the interdependency of the institutional role of audit committees and national institutions, specifically shareholder protection.
All Sessions in Track O...
- Sun: 08:00 – 09:15
- Session 40: Strategic Leadership and Governance Expanding: Shifts and New Directions in Research
- Sun: 09:45 – 11:00
- Session 283: Editor Panel: Publishing Strategic Leadership and Governance Research
- Sun: 11:15 – 12:30
- Session 38: Big Game Hunting: Accessing and Interacting with Senior Executives for Empirical Research
- Sun: 16:15 – 17:30
- Session 139: Do Top Managers Matter? Expanding the Focus and Knowledge
- Session 147: What Could Strategic IT Governance look like in Smart Cities?
- Sun: 17:45 – 00:00
- Session 324: Strategic Leadership and Governance Business Meeting
- Mon: 08:00 – 09:15
- Session 140: New Perspectives on the Outside Director Selection Process
- Mon: 11:15 – 12:30
- Session 141: Politics as Usual? Political Ideology in the Excutive Suite and Boardroom
- Session 220: Perspectives on CEO Compensation
- Mon: 13:45 – 15:00
- Session 142: Top Management Teams, Senior Executives and Corporate outcomes
- Session 215: Personality and Values in Strategic Leadership
- Mon: 16:45 – 18:00
- Session 216: Blame and Stigma in Response to Poor Orgnizational Outcomes
- Session 218: Consequences of Top Management Attitudes and Orientations for the Firm
- Tue: 08:00 – 09:15
- Session 217: Leadership and Governance in Family Firms
- Session 309: Looking Good and Sounding Better: Impression Management by CEOs
- Tue: 11:00 – 12:15
- Session 145: Strategic Leadership and Corporate Strategy
- Session 214: Director Attributes, Director Actions and Director Effectiveness
- Tue: 14:15 – 15:30
- Session 146: Gender and Diversity in Strategic Leadership and Governance
- Tue: 15:45 – 17:00
- Session 219: A Tough Crowd: Critical Examinations by Owners and Stakeholders
- Tue: 17:30 – 18:45
- Session 144: Board Structure: What Works Best?
- Session 189: Antecedents and Consequences of CEO Incentives
- Sun: 08:00 – 09:15
- Session 74: Open Strategy Workshops: Lessons Learned from Practising Strategizing
- Sun: 09:45 – 11:00
- Session 29: The Elephant in the Room: How public policy and institutions help drive innovation, entrepreneurship, and firm performance
- Session 76: The evolution of the strategy as a profession and the field of strategy
- Sun: 11:15 – 12:30
- Session 12: Environmental Entrepreneurship: How and When do Entrepreneurs address Environmental Degradation?
- Session 38: Big Game Hunting: Accessing and Interacting with Senior Executives for Empirical Research
- Sun: 13:45 – 14:30
- Session 307: Lifetime Achievement Award Recipient
- Sun: 14:45 – 15:45
- Session 7: New Frontiers in Technologies, Fields, and Business Models: Implications for Academic and Practice Knowledge Creation
- Sun: 16:15 – 17:30
- Session 61: The Institutional Level of Strategizing Activities
- Session 261: Knowledge Creation and Sharing in Virtual Communities
- Mon: 08:00 – 09:15
- Session 72: External Influences: Audiences and Media
- Session 126: Entry Mode & Cross-Border Acquisitions
- Session 140: New Perspectives on the Outside Director Selection Process
- Mon: 09:45 – 11:00
- Session 8: Elevating our Understanding of Organizational Performance: Bridging the Frontiers of Business and Corporate Strategies
- Mon: 11:15 – 12:30
- Session 149: Management and Coordination of Multinationals
- Session 220: Perspectives on CEO Compensation
- Mon: 13:45 – 15:00
- Session 16: Human Capital and Innovation
- Session 37: Political Ties: Knots or Bows?
- Session 63: Political and Material Aspects of Strategy Making
- Session 97: Accelerators, corporate VCs and new venture creation
- Session 258: Explainng CSR: External Factors
- Mon: 15:15 – 16:15
- Session 227: Mergers, Acquisitions and Divestitures: Reconfiguring Resource Bases for Value Creation and Growth
- Session 308: Strategy Beyond the Firm: Creating and Capturing Value from External Resources
- Session 310: When the Smoke Clears: The Emergence of the Cannabis Industry
- Session 311: Theory Fragmentation in Strategic Management?
- Session 312: Climate Change: Why and How Should Strategic Management Care?
- Mon: 16:45 – 18:00
- Session 42: The Word is Out! Stakeholder Responses to Public Signals of Firms' Behaviors
- Session 112: Acquisitions - Before the Deal
- Tue: 08:00 – 09:15
- Session 309: Looking Good and Sounding Better: Impression Management by CEOs
- Tue: 09:45 – 10:45
- Session 9: Whatever Happened to Theory in Strategic Management?
- Tue: 11:00 – 12:15
- Session 70: CEO Characteristics: Microfoundations of Behavioral Strategy
- Tue: 14:15 – 15:30
- Session 116: Acquisitions - After the Deal
- Tue: 15:45 – 17:00
- Session 52: Entrepreneurial business models
- Session 219: A Tough Crowd: Critical Examinations by Owners and Stakeholders
- Session 262: Pioneering Knowledge
- Tue: 17:30 – 18:45
- Session 144: Board Structure: What Works Best?
- Session 208: Internationalization Strategies and Performance