Abstract: We use upper echelons theory to derive hypotheses about the individual and joint effects of the board’s human capital, social capital, and demographic diversity on firm reputation. Our results show that the board’s social connections enhance the benefits on the firm’s reputation of having strong board human capital. We also detected a tradeoff in the case of diversity, with board social connections augmenting the impact of board gender diversity but weakening that of board age diversity on organizational reputation. Our results provide a more nuanced picture of how boards of directors serve firms and have important implications for director selection.

Abstract: It has been noted that the number of public officials serving on boards of directors have increased dramatically, and that when these individuals join a board, the company has an intended purpose of using their background to minimize hazards and gain benefits from government interaction and assist in a firm’s corporate political activities. However, it has also been shown that organizational elites tend to demonstrate a homogeneous set of political beliefs. Therefore, we investigate 1) the influence of the similarity of the political beliefs of the other board members (in aggregate) and the selected former government official and 2) the influence of the board appointment of a former government official on a strategic outcome, specifically corporate political activity.

Abstract: Lead directors preside over independent directors, occupying an influential position in organizations. This phenomenon has diffused rapidly among publicly-traded firms over the past fifteen years. Academics, however, have yet to weigh in on the consequences. In this study, we suggest that outcomes may be vastly different depending on why the firm adopted the position. We take advantage of a natural experiment wherein NYSE firms were mandated in 2003 to take a lead director whereas NASDAQ firms received no mandate. We find that NYSE adopters, who are complying with an institutional mandate, are less likely than NASDAQ adopters, who volitionally take on lead directors, to introduce good governance and, consequently, NYSE adopters have lower firm performance than NASDAQ adopters in the post-adoption period.

Abstract: Building on resource dependence and social network theory, we outline the antecedents and consequences of centralization and density in the social networks of boards of directors. We use directors' joint committee membership and demographics to infer social relationships embedded in intra-board networks. We contribute to the corporate governance literature by empirically testing the following research questions: a) How do external environmental and internal organizational demands influence board network structures?, and b) Are some structures more conducive to generating greater organizational returns than others?

Abstract: For several decades, previous studies have reported inconsistent findings regarding the association between board leadership structure and firm performance. Furthermore, previous research has ignored the relatively new development of having an independent lead director appointed within the board. In this study, we conduct a fuzzy set analysis of six causal conditions prevalent in the literature to determine whether there are one or several optimal board leadership structures. Our empirical results reveal that there are five different high-performing board leadership configurations, and four different low-performing configurations. These results suggest that future research needs to consider the nonlinear configurational context in order to best determine how board leadership influences firm performance, and that there are multiple ways to achieve high levels of firm performance.

Abstract: This proposal addresses the distinction between symbolic or substantial roles of board committees as well as possible outcomes of tendencies towards such substance and symbolism. Drawing on institutions theory, we assume that committees can be considered as firm-level institutions which can established and maintained isomorphically, the consequence being that the rules and routines formally tied to committees are not substantially applied, but only ceremonially imitated in order to gain legitimacy. In this context, using the example of audit committees, we contend that companies with a ceremonial audit committee do not take their purpose of seriously, which we expect to become visible in a lower decision making quality. Furthermore, we address the interdependency of the institutional role of audit committees and national institutions, specifically shareholder protection.